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Introduction
This essay was originally submitted to a workshop on Citizen Partici-
pation in East Asian Legal Systems held at Cornell Law School in late Sep-
tember 2006.1 If the Korean and Japanese proposals discussed at the
Conference represent the most advanced experiments in citizen participa-
tion in Asian legal systems,2 Thailand's legal system, and its lack of citizen
participation, may be more typical of the large majority of East and South-
east Asian legal systems, where the prospects for lay participation are
bound up with globalization and progress toward democracy. These com-
ments were inspired by Thailand's 1997 "People's Constitution."'3 This
remarkable constitution emphasized democracy, the rule of law, and citi-
1. 1 am grateful to Professor Valerie Hans for the opportunity to present this mate-
rial and to learn from the distinguished scholars who attended the Conference which
she organized. I would like to thank Robert Albritton, David Engel, Kevin Hewison,
Fiona Haines, and Simon Singer for helpful conversations about material in the paper. I
offer particular thanks to my two research assistants at Cornell University, Nuanchan
Singkran and Poonrit Kuakul, for translations of Thai newspaper reports and for gui-
dance in reading them, and to my New York Law School research assistant Cory Blitz for
assistance with internet research. This material is based in part upon work supported
by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0454690. Any opinions, findings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
2. Sherry Martin, Legal Consciousness and Political Socialization, paper delivered at
the Cornell Law School Conference on Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems,
September 22-23, 2006; Judge Rakwon Jang, The Law Reform Process in Korea, paper
delivered at the Cornell Law School Conference on Citizen Participation in East Asian
Legal Systems, September 22-23, 2006; Masahiro Fujita, Planning for Lay Participation in
Japan: Ideas from Research, paper delivered at the Cornell Law School Conference on
Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems, September 22-23, 2006.
3. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, B.E. 2540 (1997).
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zen participation at many levels and in many forms. The new constitution
was widely believed to mark an end to popular tolerance for extra-constitu-
tional military rule.4 The constitution, and the myth of its permanence,
lasted nearly ten years.
On September 19, 2006, the Thai military seized power and repealed
the constitution, taking particular care to note that the new constitutional
court has been "terminated," although all other courts remained open.
5
The coup is the eighteenth by the military since Thailand became a consti-
tutional democracy in 1932, and it has dismayed those who had hopes for
participatory representative democracy and the rule of law in Thailand.
6
Of course, that hope always depended on more than the constitution itself.
Hope for a government more responsive to popular will and to rights grew
with the globalization of Thailand's economy, causing the simultaneous
embourgeoisment and impoverishment of different groups of Thai, as well
as a growing impatience with corrupt authoritarian military and civilian
governments, and a shifting institutional and cultural context that sup-
ported a stronger demand for democracy. The constitution's demise in
September 2006 did not destroy the potent forces that led to its adoption in
1997. Indeed, coup leaders promised a quick return to constitutionalism
and to democracy purged of corruption, even though they disbanded Par-
liament and censored the media and internet after the takeover. 7
The coup underscores an important point about western expectations
for the establishment of rights and participation in developing Asian socie-
ties. Western governments and international agencies closely tied to west-
ern interests often advocate for transplanting western regulatory and
judicial institutions to remedy market failures. Such transplants, once in
place, may fuinction in ways that are quite different from their western mod-
els. More importantly, advocates often promote transplants for particular
political or economic interests, rather than as elements of reforms intended
to achieve broader civic goals. This makes the 1997 Constitution all the
more unique and important. Ideas about civic participation are conveyed
and received in many different ways. As Sally Engle Merry observes in her
study of the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the final step in conveying west-
ern ideas about law and rights-translation into the vernacular-depends
on many factors, including preexisting cultures and institutions, transla-
tors, the apparent risks and benefits of "taking on rights," and, more partic-
4. PASUK PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAILAND: ECONOMY AND POLITIcS 417-418
(2d ed. 2002).
5. Coup d'etat in Thailand, BANGKOK Post, Sept. 20, 2006, available at http://www.
bangkokpost.net/breaking-news/breakingnews.php?id=1 13027; Bill Barnes & Amy
Kazmin, 'Empire Strikes Back' As Thai Army Moves In, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at 8.
6. Amy Kazrnin, Investors Express Hope on Economic Benefits From Bloodless Coup,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at 9 (reporting that there had been 17 previous coups);
PHONGPAICHIT & BAKER, supra note 4.
7. Coup d'etat in Thailand, supra note 5.
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ularly, the right to participate in the political or legal system.8
The apparent coexistence of public approval for the military coup,
overwhelming electoral mandate for the ousted prime minister, universal
respect for the monarchy's moral leadership, and support for the coup
illustrates the challenge for scholars attempting to understand the pros-
pects for citizen participation in Thailand's political and legal systems. 9
The explanation for this bewildering coexistence of institutional forms par-
tially lies in Thailand's long history of authoritarian government. Yet as
the evolution of constitutionalism in the 1990s demonstrates, democracy
and citizen participation have taken root. Before the coup, Thailand
showed signs of developing at least two cultures of democracy and partici-
pation-one highly westernized and one decidedly more traditional. Both
embrace "democracy" but interpret its essence in different ways. Rather
than viewing one of these cultures as resistant to globalization, rights, or
development and the other as facilitating adaptation, we ought to view the
emerging cultures of democracy as adaptations to the unequal effects of
globalization on different social groups in Thailand. These multiple,
distinctive interpretations of democracy and the rule of law reflect in
part different responses to the unequal effects of globalization and mod-
ernization that greatly complicate the future for citizen participation in
Thailand.
I. Globalization
Contemporary, "third wave" globalization is as much about ideas as it
is about the direct flow of material and financial resources. ' 0 "First wave"
globalization grew from the resource needs of industrialization and the
expansion of global transport prior to the end of the nineteenth century. 11
"Second wave" globalization during the mid-twentieth century reflected the
establishment of global financial institutions like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.1 2 By the end of the twentieth century,
8. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING HUMAN
RIGHTS INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 215-17 (2006).
9. The King has always been and remains an ambiguous figure-formally almost
powerless but, in truth, revered beyond all others, as a person and institution, and
holder of the trump cards. PAUL HANDLEY, THE KING NEVER SMILES: A BIOGRAPHY OF THAI-
LAND'S BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (2006). In 1992, following a bloody rebellion against the
last military coup, the King required the leaders of the military and the rebellion to
prostrate themselves before him and demanded that a resolution be reached. Kevin
Hewison, Introduction: Power, Oppositions, and Democratisation, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN
THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 1, 2 (1997). The military who conducted the
recent coup formed a Democratic Reform Council with the King as its nominal head.
Coup d'etat in Thailand, supra note 5.
10. Ammar Siamwalla, Globalisation and its Governance in Historical Perspective, in
SOCIAL CHALLENGES FOR THE MEKONG REGION 13-22 (M. Kaosa-ard &J. Dore eds., 2003).
11. THE WORLD BANK, GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH AND POVERTY: BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE
WORLD ECONOMY (World Bank Policy Research Report #23591) 24-25 (2002).
12. See, e.g., Ute Piper & Lance Taylor, The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF, the
World Bank, and Inequality in a Globalized Economy, in GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSIVE
ECONOMIC POLICY 37, 38-39 (Dean Baker, et al. eds., 1998).
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globalization depended on the flow of ideas and information that allowed
multinational corporations to locate production and office facilities any-
where in the world. As a second-order effect, ideas about governance-in
particular, concepts of participation and citizenship-are an important
part of this flow.
The flow, historically from the global North to the global South, is
more complicated now. Ideas, and the institutions they are intended to
construct, may encounter established cultures and practices that leave little
space for rivals, or greatly alter their meaning, creating a two-way flow.
A further dimension of this globalization of ideas is modernity. Soci-
ologist Anthony Giddens characterizes modernity by referring to two types
of movement away from the traditional. According to Giddens, social space
and time are no longer defined by the physical space and time in which one
moves (disembeddedness). Society also strives to become increasingly
aware of itself through public and private systems of information control
(reflexivity). 13 Greater mobility and interconnectedness made possible by
technological progress permit individuals to understand themselves as part
of a far wider range of contexts, ideas, cultures, and individuals than a
century or even a few decades ago.
Access to information enhances control over our lives and influences
how we see and understand ourselves. Public and private institutions have
more information about us and process it through expert knowledge that
links identity to behavior and policies. The rise of expert systems of
knowledge is a key element of Gidden's modernity. What we have called
globalization is in large part an intensification of both of the processes that
Giddens describes, greatly extending boundaries of social space and time
and subjecting more and more individuals to information control systems.
Indeed, Giddens claims that "[miodernity is inherently globalizing.' 14
The spread of ideas about governance is part of this transformation.
As we consider replicating the jury system and lay judging in developing
societies we should try to understand the spread of liberal democratic
forms of citizen participation not only in terms of the politics of globaliza-
tion, but also as an aspect of modernization, namely the potential of these
participatory justice systems to create conflicts for individuals who are
embedded in traditional practices of authority, knowledge, and dispute res-
olution.15 Each of these legal practices furthers modernization that
reduces the value of local knowledge while empowering expert systems-
quite the opposite of our own folklore about citizen participation.
Globalization of participatory governance has contradictory implica-
tions for developing societies in part because it is both modernizing-dis-
embedding individuals from their personal and familial relationships and
reconstructing them as interchangeable citizens-and anti-modern-
13. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 21, 45 (1991).
14. Id. at 63.
15. MERRY, supra note 8, at 139-51 (describing this process in specific conflicts
between traditional and rights-generated forms of social participation in five different
societies).
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through its apparent appeal to local knowledge. But that is only part of the
story. As a general matter, there are at least two distinct but interrelated
transnational sets of ideas about participatory democracy that heighten
these contradictory effects by communicating somewhat different ideas
about participation to different audiences. Global entrepreneurship on
behalf of citizen participation risks further entrenching the pattern of une-
ven development and growing inequality.
Entrepreneurship urging governmental reform comes in two varieties,
based on their intended effects. The first is "top down" in terms of
intended effects -modernizing political systems and promoting elite-led
development. "Structural adjustment" makes markets safer. Civic partici-
pation serves to control corruption and stabilize markets and political sys-
tems by making government responsive (but not too responsive).16
The second form of entrepreneurship seeks "bottom up" reforms that
increase the well-being of individuals adversely affected by development,
though some of these changes are engineered through international and
governmental interventions from above. Western NGOs and activists have
inspired a world-wide movement for rights. They are less concerned about
institutional reforms, like juries and lay judges, than about quality of life
and basic human rights. Their interventions are often at the grassroots
level. 17
The discourse about participation for the purpose of developing rights
and capacities of individuals arises from both western and indigenous cul-
tures of participation, which sometimes have quite different implications.
Some universal human rights have strong indigenous parallels, such as
environmental rights. 18 Others are more controversial; for example, the
U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women often conflicts with traditional practices and gender
roles. 19
One example of the potential conflict between "universal" and indige-
nous rights arises out of the contentious debate about "Asian values,"
which pits advocates for Asian development under paternalistic leadership
16. "Stakeholder participation" is described as a principal goal in the most recent
World Bank country dialog monitor on Thailand that reports on World Bank funded
country development programs. THE WORLD BANK, THAILAND-WORLD BANK GROUP PART-
NERSHIP COUNTRY DIALOGUE MONITOR: JANUARY 2004-JUNE 2005 (2005). The report
praises Thailand's "emphasis on governance and decentralization" and urges further
effort to improve the "quality of government services, right-size the government bureau-
cracy, increase the competency levels of public sector employees, and promote demo-
cratic governance."
17. Amartya Sen argues that there is an important link between the realm of formal
institutions such as democracy .(and presumably other forms of participation that
increase responsiveness) and quality of life. In turn, enhancement of fundamental quali-
ties of life (health, education) leads to faster more equitable economic development
because individuals are able and motivated to participate to the full extent of their capac-
ities. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 15-21 (1999).
18. See, e.g., Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environment-Based
Cultures: The Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23 Wis. INT'L L. J.
553, 592-96 (2005).
19. MERRY supra note 8, at 90-91.
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against proponents of western individualism and individual rights. Most
of the proponents of Asian values are Asian autocrats. The dichotomy has
been rejected by most scholars, but many recognize that the "civil society
organizations" of Asian cultures may socialize individuals for civic partici-
pation in very different ways. While development has undermined the wel-
fare of traditional communities, the best solution may be not to reconstruct
civil society according to a western model. Any expectation that Asians,
and Thai in particular, will readily join secular, western-style interest
groups or readily engage in western forms of civic participation is
unrealistic.
20
II. Participation as an American Ideal
In the United States, popular understanding of participation starts
with de Tocqueville. 2 1 In 1830, de Tocqueville described the buzzing com-
merce of small town American life as the essence of civic participation. He
perceived the central role of local courts and lawyers as an expression of
interconnectedness and local regulation. De Tocqueville commented that
every local political issue enters the courts.22 In 1830s America, courts, in
some sense, were "government by the people" because there was little other
day-to-day government. Today, "adversarial legalism" is said to arise in the
United States in part from the lack of responsiveness of governmental
administration. 23 Courts are participatory, politically permeable, and sel-
dom final because they can be overruled by a more refined, authoritative
political will. Thus, courts function much like the original Madisonian
design for government. Our courts are uniquely accessible and responsive
to problems that are considered political, rather than judicial, in most
societies.2
4
This is a vision of participatory governance that does not appear to
allow for disembeddedness or to defer to expert systems of information
gathering and control. On closer examination, however, the seeds of both
are present. James Madison believed that the national legislature creates a
space for genuinely disinterested consideration of the public good, pre-
cisely because the individuals are disembedded, and expert in governance
because they are likely to be an elite. But Madison's vision was not modern
because he did not expect government at higher levels to do much. Now
that national government is the center of action, modernization grows
from Madison's pre-modern institutional vision.
20. See generally Randall Peerenboom, Social Networks, Civil Society, Democracy, and
Rule of Law: A New Conceptual Framework, in THE POLITICS OF AFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP:
EAST ASIA AND BEYOND 249 (Hahm Chaihark &Daniel Bell eds., 2004).
21. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Bruce Frohnen ed., Henry Reeve,
C.B. trans., 2004) (1889).
22. See id. at 73-79.
23. See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (2003).
24. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Bhophals, Past and Present: The Changing Legal Response
to Mass Disaster, 10 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 151 (1990).
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Today, developed democracies have institutionalized many different
forms of citizen participation in governance, although they do not share all
of them. Different forms of participation in governance have different ori-
gins, different effects, and depend on different clusters of perceptions and
practices to support them. Instead of a general model, there are many par-
ticular forms of participation in particular locations. Although not all of
them are successful, the idea of participation remains powerful and influ-
ential because we trust it. 2
5
A positive perspective on participatory procedure is offered by Tom
Tyler and his many collaborators who have shown that trust in judicial and
policy decisions increases when procedures are perceived as fair. 26 Partici-
pation as an interested party is one of those procedural ingredients, but
third-party citizen participation, through juries or lay judges, may also
increase legitimacy under the right conditions. 2 7 Jury trials, though they
are a rare event in our legal system, remain a powerful and important sym-
bol, and an arguably important check on prosecutorial, litigant, and judi-
cial power.
IIl. Case study: Thai Institutional Change
Thailand has been influenced by both the top down and bottom up
contemporary global flow of ideas about democracy and participation.
The influence of western jurisprudence on Thai legal institutions, however,
reaches back to the nineteenth century. Assimilation of European jurispru-
dence into Thai legal culture accelerated in the nineteenth century, incor-
porating various elements without losing its distinctive character.
Thailand adopted the form of a modern administrative state, but power
remained in the hands of an autocratic ruler and his royal family, who
25. The modern development of the due process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments of the U.S. Constitution is a powerful institutional legitimator of citizen
participation in adjudications. Notably, the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) guaranteed the right to participate in adjudication of one's
property rights to the most poor and deeply subordinated members of society-welfare
recipients. Yet how did it change outcomes, legal consciousness (of recipients), or U.S.
culture? Increasing number of individual adjudications soon led to complex codifica-
tions of rules which, in practice, proved to be no less arbitrary and manipulable. The
legal consciousness of welfare recipients tilted less toward empowerment than increas-
ing recognition of need for the expertise of a legally trained advocate. While Goldberg
recognized the growing significance of entitlements in modern society, it made entitle-
ments a symbolic political target of conservatives. A conservative Congress eventually
pushed for elimination all federal welfare entitlements. Thus, Goldberg, and related
cases establishing a constitutional right to participation in adjudication, contributed to
unexpected institutional consequences: increasing cost, complexity, subordination of
lawyers, and ultimately declining political support for entitlements. How's that for a
bummer of a message about participation?
26. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, The Overall Influence of Social Motives
on Decision Acceptance, in TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH
THE POLICE AND COURTS 76-96 (2002), reprinted in PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: VOLUME 1 143,
157 (Tom R. Tyler ed.) (2005).
27. This is a premise of the experimental introduction of lay judging in Korea and
Japan. See supra note 2.
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combined the absolute authority of the Monarchy (Mahakesat), symbolic
representation of the Nation (Chat), and control over the central adminis-
tration of Buddhism (Satsana). 28 The Thai monarchy's historical compro-
mise with western power opened Thai legal culture to the influence of
powerful new values, including the concepts of equality and human rights.
These new values transformed Thai politics and contributed to the creation
of a constitutional monarchy in 1932.29
Frank Reynolds contrasts Thai "civic religion" with the central values
in American culture that Robert N. Bellah termed "utilitarian individual-
ism."3 0 While the American civic religion developed from a tradition of
individual freedom of conscience and dissent, treating institutionalized
authority with suspicion, Thai civic religion grew from a tradition far more
respectful of the authority of traditional, moral, and spiritual leaders rather
than the moral conscience of individuals.3 1 Nevertheless, Thai legal cul-
ture valorized the people's welfare in a way that enabled advocates to lever-
age it on behalf of popular movements. Equality and democracy (if not
precisely representative democracy) appealed not only to elites, but also to
the Thai people generally, and observers credit growing support for these
values with the strong rejection of military rule in 1992 followed by pres-
sure for democracy and constitutional reform. 32
In 1996, coincident with the final stages of constitutional reform, the
Thai economy collapsed. The collapse created an opportunity for "struc-
tural adjustment"-a prototypical "top down" flow of ideas about govern-
ance-through pressure from the International Monetary Fund to increase
transparency and market stability. 33 For several decades, the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, and other powerful international financial
actors with an interest in Thailand's economic development added their
influential support for governmental reforms to increase market stability,
including greater participation by citizens through decentralization and
promotion of civil society organizations. 34 Thai public opinion attributed
the crash to mismanagement and corruption, adding fuel to the constitu-
tional reform movement. 35 Parliament approved the draft constitution and
sent it to voters just as the effects of the crash reached their height in late
1996.
However, the Thai people generated the primary pressure for a more
democratic constitution and for greater democratic participation. The new
28. See Frank E. Reynolds, Dhamma in Dispute: The Interactions of Religion and Law
in Thailand, 28 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 433, 442 (1994).
29. Id. at 442-43.
30. Id. at 441.
31. See id. at 441-43.
32. Phongpaichit & Baker, supra note 4, at 411-414 et seq.
33. Id. 430-436.
34. See Chantana Banpasirichote, Civil Society and Good Governance: A New Chapter
in Thailand's Political Reform?, in 1 DEMOCRACy AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN ASIA: GLOBALIZA-
TION, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN ASIA 213, 225 (Fahimul Quadir & Jayant Lele
eds., 2004).
35. See id. at 229.
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Thai Constitution reflects not only the influence of western institutions on
Thai political leaders and intellectuals, but also mass public opinion that
favored democratic reforms. Whether the specific institutional reforms
comport with popular understandings of democracy is an important and
debatable question. In Part VI of this article, I describe democracy as it is
viewed through the lens of traditional Thai culture. For instance, domestic
and international NGO workers and activists, who have worked for
decades with rural communities to protect their way of life, have also influ-
enced the perceptions and values of rural Thai by promoting a "bottom up"
understanding of democracy. 3 6 We are only beginning to understand the
influence of both international and domestic advocacy on popular Thai
values and legal consciousness.
In 1997, following protracted political struggle and with overwhelm-
ing public approval, a new constitution expanded individual and group
rights, greatly extended popular participation in government, and created
new institutions to insure accountability under law, including a politically
independent constitutional court. The new constitution mandated partici-
pation in many different forms, including, for example, decentralization of
power, fiscal control, and electoral democracy. 37 It also guaranteed indi-
vidual rights that characterize the constitution of a modern liberal state,
the right to information, and the ability to participate in government deci-
sions affecting the "quality of the environment, health and sanitary condi-
tions, the quality of life or any other material interest concerning him or
her or a local community ... as provided by law."'3 s Further, the constitu-
tion protected the right to "participate in the decision-making process of
State officials in the performance of administrative functions which affect
or may affect his or her rights and liberties, as provided by law."'3 9 The
constitution extended democracy to local offices and created an anti-cor-
ruption commission to ensure effective voting and make office holding eas-
ier for those who are not super-rich by attempting to reduce the
importance of money in elections. 40 The constitution also established
major court reforms, creating administrative courts to oversee the vast
entrenched bureaucracy and a Constitutional Court, a majority of whose
members are non-political. 4 1 Pro-participation reformers also demanded a
provision for direct popular participation in oversight through a petition
process that allowed 50,000 citizens to initiate both legislation and investi-
36. Phongpaichit & Baker, supra note 4, at 436-39; Prudhisan Jumbala & Maneerat
Mitptasat, Non-governmental Development Organizatins: Empowerment and Environment,
in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 195, 214-15 (Kevin
Hewison ed., 1997).
37. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, § 282-90.
38. Id. §§ 56, 59.
39. Id. § 60; see also id. § 76 ("The State shall promote and encourage public partici-
pation in laying down policies, making decision on political issues, preparing economic,
social and political development plans, and inspecting the exercise of State power at all
levels.").
40. See id. 88 297-302.
41. See id. § 276-80 (describing the administrative court); see id. §§ 255-70
(describing the Constitutional court).
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gation of corrupt practices. 4 2
Thailand's "People's Constitution," regrettably now repealed, repre-
sented the most extensive pro-rights, pro-participation public law reform in
any emerging society, with the exception of South Africa. 4 3 But the practi-
cal effect of reform continues to depend not only on officials' respect for
citizens' individual and participatory rights, but also on Thai citizens' will-
ingness to invoke them.
Assimilation of western institutions has affected the form of the Thai
legal system, which has both civil and common law elements; however, the
prevalence of code law, absence of citizen participation, and historically
limited authority for judicial review suggest that civil law predominates.
Specialized courts have existed for some time in the areas of tax, intellec-
tual property and international trade, labor, and juvenile and family jus-
tice.4 4 Three of these, the Intellectual Property and World Trade Court,
Labor Courts, and Juvenile and Family Courts empanel lay judges with
career professionals. 45 Lay judges are experts appointed for a term of
years. In family court, at least one of the lay judges must be a woman. 46
The forms of lay judging incorporated by the Thai courts are clearly one
result of the growing influence of western ideas about law.4 7 In the areas
of intellectual property, world trade, and labor, involvement with the global
market may have accelerated these developments. Lay participation in spe-
cialized courts in Thailand is ripe for study.
The importance of citizen participation in governance and in the
unfolding developments in Thailand, including lay participation in the
legal process, remains a question. In other societies, elites have introduced
lay participation in courts as a means of increasing the legitimacy of courts
and other institutions of government. In Thailand, the 1997 constitutional
reform sprang not from elites' concerns about the legitimacy of a govern-
ment that served their interests, but from widespread concerns about a
government that, at times, served neither elite nor popular interests due to
corruption and the absence of effective democracy. Court reform was per-
ceived as a mechanism of corruption control and rights enforcement, while
democracy was achieved through an expanded electoral system and direct
citizen participation in policy making. Thus, a careful reading of the 1997
Constitution suggests that courts were to assume the role of guarantors of
good government and popular rights, but remained the domain of elites.48
42. Id.§ 304.
43. See Andrew Harding, SOUTH EAST ASIA, 1997-2003: Two CASE STUDIES ON POLIT-
ICS OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 14 (2003), available at http://www.law.uvic.ca/seals/
forums//attachment.php?attachmentid=6.
44. Vichai Ariyanutaka, Sophistication of Dispute Resolution in Special Courts: A Per-
spective from Thailand, in LAW, DEVELOPMENT, AND Socio-EcONOMIC CHANGES IN ASIA
(Naoyiki Sakumoto et al. eds., 2003).




48. PASUK PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAILAND'S CRISIS 118-19 (2000).
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Unsurprisingly, court reform in developing societies is typically a top
down enterprise, and, characteristically, the domain of experts influenced
by western values and ideas. Where this leaves courts and the rule of law
in popular consciousness as sources of political legitimacy remain to be
seen.
IV. Legal Consciousness
The 1997 Thai Constitution mandated participation in many forms,
but traditional Thai civic culture as described by Frank Reynolds does not
emphasize participation so much as responsive authority. The question is:
what forms of participation are valued and trusted by the Thai? What
effect has the opportunity to participate directly or indirectly (through rep-
resentatives) had on perceptions of rights and the way "rights become
active" in daily life?
James Klein has noted that the 1997 Constitution facilitated popular
participation in government on at least five different "levels," including (i)
"cognizance" or consciousness of rights to participate, (ii) voting in elec-
tions, (iii) providing input into policy formulation, (iv) initiating oversight
through appeal or litigation, and (v) direct participation by running for
office. 49 Provisions of the Constitution enhanced every level of participa-
tion. In 2003, the Thai government drafted a law giving effect to the new
Constitutional rights to participate that elaborated citizens' rights to par-
ticipate in administrative decision making.50 Notwithstanding the Consti-
tution's emphasis on participation, Klein is not optimistic about the
likelihood that the law will have any immediate effect on widespread resis-
tance to public participation by administrative agencies themselves. 5 1 An
important question for the longer term is what value the Thai themselves
place on these forms of participation, a fortiori, what appeal do more spe-
cialized forms of citizens participation have such as juries and lay judges?
Law and society scholarship has drawn attention to interpretive
processes that accompany involvement with law, referring to the mental
states of those influenced by law as "legal consciousness." Social scientists
who study juries or lay judges have known for some time that wealth, edu-
cation, specific experiences, value orientations, or attitudes may be
predictors of perceptions of injury or wrong doing and appropriate legal
remedies. In contrast to studies of predictors of perceptions and actions of
citizens participating in the legal process, research on legal consciousness
embraces more than fixed attitudes or demographic indicators and consid-
ers a broad range of social action in everyday life contexts. Research on
legal consciousness draws attention to cognition, the process by which
49. James Klein, Public Participation and Hearings in the New Thai Political Context, in
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION IN GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING (Ken-
neth Hailer & Patcharee Siroros eds., 2003).
50. See generally CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND.
51. See Klein, supra note 49, at 122-29.
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individuals come to know the social world and give it meaning.52 One
important conclusion reached through such research is that cognition
influenced by law may affect an individual's self-perceptions, social rela-
tionships, and selection of interpretive frameworks for interactions in the
everyday world, as well as one's interactions with formal legal institutions.
Legal consciousness may not only influence individuals in "taking on
rights" (to use Merry's suggestive phrase5 3) as a good bet or leaving them
alone in interactions with authorities or power holders, but may also influ-
ence expectations for daily interactions with family and social intimates.54
Through such subtle and indirect effects on experience and perception law
influences both deliberate choices and unselfconscious conduct that gives
any form of authority or social order its meaning.55
Further, research on legal consciousness has suggested the impor-
tance of multiple discourses of interpretation that guide both perceptions
of what is and of what ought to be.56 Where a discourse of rights prevails
in individuals' narratives of social relationships and conflict, we might say
that an ideology of legality has become established. Where other dis-
courses are chosen to explain the occurrence or resolution of conflict, legal
consciousness recedes in importance.
V. Thai Legal Consciousness and Participatory Governance
Proposals to introduce lay judging in Korea and Japan on an experi-
mental basis are intended to strengthen the legitimacy of courts that are
perceived as elite, authoritarian, and non-transparent. These experiments
in lay participation appear to be responsive to broader social changes in
the two democracies, namely deepening liberal democratic values. The
proposals for symbolic participation in the legal system through the pres-
ence of a handful of lay judges suggests not only a demand for par-
ticipatory representative institutions of governance but also the
importance of courts and, by inference, the transparent rule of law. Courts
matter where the rule of law matters. Where legitimacy is grounded in
something other than participatory representation and the rule of law,
courts are unlikely venues for such symbolic reforms.
Thailand's recent history of popular support for monarchy, authorita-
rian civilian or military rulers, and parliamentary democracy is puzzling
for scholars attempting to understand the importance of law and democ-
racy. In many respects, Thailand's repeated return to authoritarian rule is
more like the experience of its authoritarian neighbors, Singapore, Malay-
52. Frank Munger, Culture, Power, and Law: Thinking About the Anthropology of
Rights in Thailand in an Era of Globalization, N.Y. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
53. Martin, supra note 2.
54. See id.
55. See DAVID ENGEL & FRANK MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN
THE LIVES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003).
56. Id. See chapter four for examples, narratives of persons with disabilities about
social injustice included discourses of religion, the market, or family obligations as well
as a variety of discourses about rights.
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sia, and Indonesia than the more advanced democracies of Korea and
Japan. Yet the public's assumption that many of the principles of the 1997
Constitution will be retained, together with a history of popular move-
ments for social justice and a legal profession that is both increasing rap-
idly in size and has at times defended human rights, suggests a continuing
opening for participatory governance.
In this part of the article, I consider evidence bearing on the aspects of
Thai legal consciousness most relevant to citizen participation and the rule
of law. High quality surveys of public opinion now available in Thailand
provide some help in identifying key elements of legal consciousness, 5 7
and a recent analysis of this data examines the breadth and strength of
support for democratic institutions and acceptance of control by laws, pro-
cedures, and institutions created through democratic processes.5 8 Data
from the 2001 Asian Barometer survey shows Thai citizens' strong prefer-
ence for democracy over all other forms of government. 5 9 For example,
83.8 percent said that democracy is always preferable to authoritarian
forms of government.60 Although Thai express a strong preference for
democracy, the meaning of "democracy" cannot be taken for granted, nor
can support for participatory representative institutions and the rule of
law, assumptions that might be made safely in a survey conducted in the
United States or Europe. Just a few decades ago, historian David Wyatt
reported that some rural people thought that the Thai words for democracy
and constitution were the names of members of the King's family.6 1
In 2001, about 70 percent of Thai surveyed could name at least one
specific characteristic of democracy and 25 percent two or more. Most
frequently mentioned were protection of freedom and civil liberties (38%
of the 70% or 28% of all surveyed), equality (10.5% of all surveyed), and
individualism (7.7%).62 There was little support for "Asian values" such as
social responsibility or communalism. 63 More important for the future of
western-style liberal democracy, there was little evidence that the Thai
associate democracy with political and participatory elements that West-
57. The Asian Barometer describes itself as "an applied research program on public
opinion on political values, democracy, and governance" encompassing survey data
from twelve East Asian political systems and five South Asian countries on "citizens'
attitudes and values toward politics, power, reform, and democracy in Asia." See gener-
ally, The Asian Barometer, available at http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/
introduction/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
58. See generally, Robert Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Developing Democracy
under a New Constitution in Thailand (2004), available at http://www.asianbarometer.
org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.28.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) (dis-
cussing the Asian Barometer data drawn from a survey conducted in 2001).
59. Id. at 15 and Table 2.
60. Id. at 45.
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id. at 11 and Table 1.
63. Robert Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Social and Institutional Supports for
Plural Democracy in Eight Asian Nations: A Cross-National and Within-Nation Analysis, 16
(2005), available at http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/working
papers/no.31.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
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ern conceptions take for granted.6 4 Indeed, there was strong support for
abolishing opposition parties. 65 Overall, 76 percent said diverse views
made society chaotic, and 45 percent said they should not have to tolerate
views that differed sharply from their own. 6 6 These views, combined with
a strong belief in traditional civil liberties such as freedom of speech, yield
a complex picture of independence and intolerance, direct majoritarian
democracy, and rejection of the conflict and contention of party politics
and representative democracy. 6 7
While parties and party politics face great skepticism in Thailand, the
highly popular 1997 Thai Constitution provided for direct participation in
many ways-extending electoral democracy to local government, providing
for public participation in administrative decision-making, and direct refer-
enda by petition.68 The constitution mandated non-partisan oversight to
protect the people's rights (including rights to participate). 6 9 Yet inclusion
of constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to participate must be
reconciled with seemingly contradictory tendencies. For example, Thai cit-
izens gave mass support in recent elections to the authoritarian Prime Min-
ister Thaksin Shinawatra, and later apparently approved the bloodless
military coup that sidelined him in September 2006.
Further qualifying Thai support for democracy is the trust in tradi-
tional, non-partisan, and undemocratic institutions. The Constitutional
Court is the institution that enjoys the most trust-over 82 percent of
respondents. 70 Other non-partisan governmental agencies also have
gained trust. The military is trusted by 80 percent of the respondents,
however, second only to the Constitutional Court. 71 By contrast newspa-
pers, parties, and NGOs receive low ratings, even lower than the much-
feared police. 72
The apparently contradictory tendencies of Thai popular support for
different forms of government may be explained in part by a pronounced
difference in the perceptions, and legal consciousness, of two important
groups in contemporary Thai society. Albritton and Bureekul argue that
there is a pervasive split between two groups of Thai citizens characterized
by three overlapping differences: urban and rural, more educated and less
64. For example, few respondents mentioned parties, elections, or parliamentary
decision making. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 16-17.
66. Id. at 19.
67. The meaning of an apparently strong preference for democracy over other forms
of government is also tempered by the fact that about fifty percent would prefer eco-
nomic development to having a democratic government. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 18-19.
69. In addition to creating a non-partisan constitutional court and administrative
courts, the 1997 constitutional created a non-partisan National Election Commission
and a non-partisan National Counter Corruption Commission. CONSTITUTION OF THE
KINGDOM OF THAIAND, § 136 et seq. and § 297 et seq.
70. Albritton & Thawilwadee, supra note 58, at 27, Table 10.
71. Id. at 28.
72. Id.
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educated, and "modern" values and "traditional" values.7 3 Driving the dif-
ferences, they argue, is acceptance or rejection of traditional values. The
survey measured acceptance of traditional values by the respondent's
agreement with the importance of obedience to parents, a hiring preference
for friends and relatives, family interest taking precedence over the individ-
ual, the loss of face by a male who works for a female boss, the belief that
elders should resolve disputes, and the idea that husbands should per-
suade daughters-in-law to obey their mother.7 4 Acceptance of traditional
values was in turn highly correlated with low respect for minority rights,
high trust in social and political institutions, and weak support for the rule
of law. 75 Not surprisingly, embracing traditional values was more charac-
teristic of rural Thai, while rejecting traditional values and embracing
"modern" values was strongly associated with urban residence and more
education.76 Albritton and Bureekul point out that apparently there is an
ironic concluding twist to the tale of two democracies. While a moderniz-
ing bourgeoisie should in theory be the vanguard of participatory represen-
tative democratization, precisely the opposite seems to be true in Thailand.
Urban, educated Thai now seem to mistrust democracy precisely because
rural Thai embrace it uncritically and without expectation of controlling
their corrupt political representatives. 77
We might compare the values of the rural majority in Thailand as
revealed by the survey data with de Tocqueville's description of citizen par-
ticipation, still a principal source of Americans' continuing vision of gov-
ernance. Participatory governance in America is associated with belief in
civic (if not social) equality, tolerance of conflict, accountability to local
communities of electors, and distrust of traditional hierarchy, large institu-
tions, and expert administrators. In almost every respect, the rural Thai
majority's traditionalism influences them to hold an opposing view. The
powerful urban, educated minority are more sympathetic to modernism
and participatory representative governance when it reflects their values,
but they are skeptical of any form of participatory governance dominated
by the rural electorate. Further, the strong aversion of both urban and
rural Thai to conflict and intolerance of opposing political views evidenced
by the survey data strongly suggest a lack of trust in fellow citizens. In
contemporary Thailand, it is hard to imagine that lay participation in the
legal process-especially by average citizens rather than experts-would
increase the legitimacy of courts or the rule of law.78
73. Id. at 22-26, 29ff.
74. See id. at 43 (Appendix 1).
75. Acceptance of the rule of law is defined by level agreement with seven proposi-
tions: government should decide what can be discussed; government leaders should be
followed like heads of a family; judges should defer to the executive; political leaders
should be able to ignore procedures; with support, a leader should ignore minority
views; if the country is in difficulty, it is OK to disregard laws. Id. at 43 (Appendix 1).
76. Id. at 22-26.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Further, the Asian Barometer data for other countries included in the survey
suggest that the same pattern exists in many developing Asian societies, namely the
existence of two cultures (and perhaps two ideals of democracy or rule of law) character-
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Surveys of public opinion offer one kind of evidence of the prospects
for participatory forms of governance and the rule of law, but other forms
of evidence help us understand how these orientations toward democracy
and law may influence daily social life as well as interactions with legal
and political institutions. A recent ethnographic study of the way that ordi-
nary Thai respond to injuries caused by strangers (for example, an auto
accident) illustrates how traditional values and globalization have com-
bined in a unique way to reduce the likelihood of accountability under the
law. 79 Contrary to expectations, globalization has led to a decline in will-
ingness among Thai interviewed in this study to invoke rights in response
to injury. This is because changes associated with globalization uprooted
traditional forms of dispute resolution that operated in the shadow of law
by destroying the relationships that made them meaningful. 80 Instead,
injured individuals found resolution in an evolving form of Buddhist prac-
tice. The return to Buddhism in a new form suggests the continuing
impact of the modern Thai civic religion on legal consciousness.
Scholar Peter Jackson, who has studied Buddhist influence on contem-
porary Thai social movements, 8 l concludes that while religious diversity
has increased in Thailand, and the state has become secularized because
Buddhism itself is no longer controlled by the state, Thai society remains
deeply religious, strongly suggesting that legal consciousness will continue
to be influenced by elements of Thailand's "civic religion."8 2 Even if other
institutional elements favor greater reliance on law or the court system for
addressing injuries, Buddhism may well have its impact on the meaning of
injury or injustice and the adequacy of remedies offered by law.
Globalization and differences between rural and urban social organi-
zation and values have intertwined in other ways to create a two-track envi-
ronmental movement in Thailand. The engine of social change has been
Thailand's booming economy following the end of the Vietnam War, and
the subsequent decline of communist influence in the rural areas of North-
eastern Thailand.8 3 Rapid growth accelerated exploitation of timber,
waterways, and other natural resources, with two profound political
effects. First, the former political periphery, including the rural poor and
ized by modern versus traditional values, urban versus rural cultures, more education
and western acculturation versus less education and traditional acculturation. Albritton
& Bureekul, supra note 58.
79. David Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts,
and Karma in Thailand, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 469 (2005).
80. Id. at 469, 502.
81. PeterJackson, Withering Centre, Flourishing Margins: Buddhism's Changing Politi-
cal Roles, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION (Kevin
Hewison, ed., 1997).
82. Frank Reynolds, Dhamma in Dispute: The Interaction of Religion and Law in Thai-
land, 28 LAW & Soc'y REV. 433 (1994).
83. Philip Hirsch, The Politics of Environment: Opposition and Legitimacy, in POLITICAL
CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997). See also
Philip Hirsch, Environment and Environmentalism in Thailand: Material and Ideological
Bases, in SEEING FOREST FOR TREES: ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THAILAND
(Philip Hirsch ed., 1996).
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ethnic minorities living within the forests, or on its margins, or whose vil-
lages were in the future floodplain of a proposed dam, has become politi-
cally active. After years of contact with activist NGO workers, they have
been motivated to seek redress from the government, and if none is forth-
coming, to undertake direct action to save homes and livelihoods. 8 4 They
have been supported by international human rights and environmental
NGOs opposing massive development projects worldwide that are planned
and implemented without input from the affected communities. The World
Bank, one of the world's chief dam builders and a source of funding for the
Pak Mun Dam in Northeast Thailand, is a particular target of NGO opposi-
tion. The Pak Mun Dam project threatened to inundate many villages and
became the focus of the Assembly of the Poor's most widely known
campaign.8 5
The Assembly of the Poor, an important rural movement in opposition
to destructive government-sponsored development projects, has con-
structed its claims for justice from traditional concepts of popular welfare
and moral accountability. Rather than formal law and litigation, its leaders
deployed demonstrations, petitions to government officials, and media
campaigns. 86 In rural Thailand, where adversarial legalism is less familiar
or common, Thai social movements have seldom relied on litigation to
advance their goals. Both before and after the ratification of the "People's
Constitution," many groups of rural Thai citizens have preferred to take
their grievances directly to government officials and the King by means of
petitions and demonstrations at Government House, rather than by invok-
ing political and legal means afforded by law or by the Constitution. As
recently as April 2006, the King departed from prepared remarks to
admonish petitioners to use their constitutional means of redress. These
remarks served as a monarchical reminder about the power afforded by
law: use it or lose it.8 7 Even the rights-advocating Lawyers Council of Thai-
land has encouraged such traditional appeals to the paternalism of govern-
ment bureaucrats by acting as a go-between for petitioners on behalf of
traditional communities but rarely using the courts to seek redress on their
behalf.88
The second effect of development on environmentalism has occurred
because Thailand's boom has expanded greatly Thailand's "middle class."
Thailand's varied social strata do not correspond to Europe and America's
classes of property-owners and salaried tiers. Instead, an emerging middle
class, comprised of salaried and professional workers in government, uni-
versities, and industries, together with a rapidly growing number of entre-
preneurs, is beginning to flex its political muscle. This middle class
84. Jurnbala & Mitprasat, supra note 36. See also BRUCE MISSINGHAM, THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE POOR IN THAILAND (2003).
85. See Missingham, supra note 84, at 38-41.
86. See generally, id. at 38-41.
87. See Roundup: Thai King Criticizes Current Political Mess, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
April 26, 2006, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/26/eng2O0604
26_261157.html#.
88. Id.
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supports causes that express their values and, frequently, take critical
views of government. On the one hand, the environmental movement has
been characterized by rural activism, supported by transnational and Thai
NGO's and, significantly, activist monks whose actions and words mobilize
the Thai civic religion with great power.8 9 On the other hand, a more tech-
nocratic, nonconfrontational environmentalism is supported by the contri-
butions of the "salariat,"90 including entrepreneurs who have found
environmentalism a useful accommodation, and by transnational NGOs
advocating "sustainable" or "responsible" development. 9 1
Willingness to "take on" participatory rights may be influenced by
culture-the framework of values and expectations created through shared
experience, but also, as the study of Thai injuries showed, by changing
patterns of opportunity and risk. The government has used force against
peaceful resistance to its authority. For example, the administration of
ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra faced serious charges of human
rights abuse for his administration's treatment of protesting Muslims in
Southern Thailand and other groups.9 2 His government also faced accusa-
tions of widespread corruption that undermined responsible public admin-
istration.9 3 James Klein's review of the prospects for increased public
participation after the 1997 constitution concludes by observing that there
was an unbroken pattern of indifference by bureaucrats to the legal rights
of the public to participate in government decision making.9 4 Local polit-
ics was long renowned for the use of strong-arm tactics to induce compli-
ance with the wishes of the powerful, a practice which also continued after
the reaffirmation of local democracy and participation rights in 1997. 95
89. See generally Susan M. Darlington, The Ordination of a Tree: The Buddhist Ecology
Movement in Thailand, 37 ETHNOLOGY 1, Winter 1998; Philip Hirsch & Larry Lohmann,
Contemporary Politics of Environment in Thailand, 29 ASTON SURVEY 439 (1989).
90. Pasuk and Baker use this term to describe one of the relatively educated and well
to do groups that make up the middle class in Thai society. Pasuk Pongpaichit & Chris
Baker, Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND:
DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 32-35 (Kevin Hewison ed., 1996).
91. Jumbala & Mitprasat, supra note 36, at 196.
92. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006 REPORT ON THAIrAND, available at http:/
/hrw.org/english/docs/2006/O1/18/thailal2251txt.htm; THE ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION REPORT, available at http://www.ahrchk.net/pr/mainfile.php/2006mr/356/.
93. Specific charges of corruption have included deals that favored members of the
Prime Minister's family, but corruption reached as far as the non-partisan National Elec-
tion Commission and led to the invalidation of an election. For a discussion on Thas-
kin's money policies see Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, THAKSIN: THE BUSINESS OF
POLITICS IN THAILAND 197-224 (2004).
94. See Klein, supra note 49.
95. Id. Klein describes skillful disrespect for the right to participate in government
decision making: narrow interpretation of prior law, perfunctory hearings without sig-
nificant effect, SLAPP litigation against critics of private development, resulting riots
and demonstrations outside government offices. Where the power of government offi-
cials and private power-brokers has been seriously challenged, violent reprisals are not
unknown.
Vol. 40
2007 Constitutional Reform in Thailand
Conclusion
Studying the prospects for citizen participation in the legal systems of
Asian societies reminds us of the unique nature of the liberal European-
American legal system, and how important its historical and cultural ante-
cedents are to the establishment of its particular forms of citizen participa-
tion and empowerment.9 6 The effects of political and legal institutions
depend upon the symbolic and social resources that a society offers. Juries
function because courts work in certain ways in Europe and the United
States. The impact of lay judges on popular perceptions of courts is impor-
tant where courts themselves are regarded as playing an important, if com-
plex, role in protecting democratic values. The unique virtue of a liberal
legal system is that it is perceived as supporting democracy (by guarantee-
ing the rules of democracy) while also acting independently of
majoritarian or popular justice. An independent judiciary can protect indi-
viduals against abusive officials or an abusive public. The very indepen-
dence of liberal legal institutions often makes them appear remote and
sometimes unpopular. Lay participation is one mechanism that arguably
helps close the gap between judicial independence and popular legitimacy.
The preconditions for citizen participation are not met, however,
where the law seems irrelevant to everyday practices of redressing injustice
perpetrated by other citizens and government officials. Legal conscious-
ness is one aspect of globalization. Legal consciousness linking the legiti-
macy of governmental institutions to citizen participation cannot develop
unless rights and participation appear to be good bets. For some-prima-
rily those benefiting from globalization-they often are. Others who have
not benefited from globalization may not perceive their rights and partici-
pation the same. Our brief look at Thailand shows that the effects of
globalization are more complex than such a simple economic or social
calculus could predict. A large majority of Thai trust traditional authorities
and mistrust conflict resolution through partisan political institutions. For
them, traditional authority may seem to be the only thing that works. The
context is critical. Global development creates a motive for change, but
existing institutions and available resources shape the direction of change.
It is hard to imagine common people, who may perceive themselves
marginalized by the politics of development and globalization, investing
legitimacy in criminal juries where the military and police are trusted to
take care of the nation but are often perceived to be lawless. It is equally
difficult to imagine common people investing legitimacy in civil juries and
lay judges where ordinary citizens do not think law offers a meaningful
solution for conflict.
96. See generally Bernadette Meyler, The Trials and Tribulations of the English Jury:
Some Lessons for Emergent Systems of Lay Participation, paper delivered at the Cornell
Law School Conference on Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems, September
22-23, 2006.
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Afterword
And what about Thailand's "September surprise?". The unexpected
military coup placed hopes for constitutionally-grounded citizen participa-
tion in Thailand's political and legal systems in a new light as old patterns
reappeared. Many saw the hand of the King behind the military coup and
a general vote of "no confidence" in democracy by the traditional elite.
This discouraging perspective, although supported by the evidence of con-
tact between coup leaders and the King prior to the coup, may overestimate
the power of such traditional elites to veto democracy for the foreseeable
future. An alternative, institutional perspective would emphasize instead a
cyclic pattern caused by the rivalry among competing groups with power to
veto each other's designs for long-term hegemony. A proposition called
Arrow's Theorem, which emphasizes the effects of competing, non-overlap-
ping majorities, is well-known among theorists of legislative decision-
making, and might explain why neither democracy nor extreme authorita-
rianism prevails for long in Thailand.9 7 Although majorities oppose cor-
ruption, favor economic development, and embrace democracy, they are
non-overlapping majorities that are often divided on other issues. Thus,
rural and urban Thai oppose corruption but are divided on questions of
economic development and, for now, democracy. Urban middle class and
traditional elites, such as royals, bureaucrats, and the military, agree on
stability but are often at odds about corruption and democracy. Rural
Thai have been courted by the King's development projects but often seem
to have different views of democracy and corruption, though they are
rarely in open conflict because the King is revered and royal influence in
politics is seldom made public. Yet, this perspective also seems to con-
demn Thailand to a stalemate that is inconsistent with the rapid economic
and social change that Thailand has experienced over the past half
century.
A third interpretation is that the coup does not signal a return to cyclic
instability at all. Although the initial deadline set for restoration of consti-
tutional democracy has passed, coup leaders have publicly acknowledged
the importance of expectations unleashed by the 1997 Constitution. It is
difficult to imagine that these leaders will reject principles such as individ-
ual liberties, non-partisan anti-corruption institutions, and a constitutional
court, which are so strongly embraced by a large majority of the people.
Placing genuine political control in the hands of elected representatives will
be contentious, although restructuring the power of the elected Prime Min-
ister will be the most difficult task. All agree on corruption control, but the
gap is wide between the populism of the rural majority and the preferences
of urban Thai for pliable electoral politics responsive to aspirations of the
middle class. Nevertheless, if Thailand's constitutional restoration
includes more effective guarantees of civil and political liberty, then electo-
ral politics, fueled by Thailand's successful economic development, is
97. See generally KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1970)
(establishing the principle of "Arrow's Theorem").
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likely to continue to grow in importance, and Thailand's political and legal
systems will evolve along a new, as yet, unpredictable path where the social
and political rights of the majority will become an increasingly important
focus in the effort by the government to achieve stability and legitimacy.

